Money and capital by S. Boragan Aruoba et al.
working
paper
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND
07  14
Money and Capital
by S. Borağan Aruoba, Christopher J. Waller, 
and Randall WrightWorking papers of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland are preliminary materials circulated to 
stimulate discussion and critical comment on research in progress. They may not have been subject to the 
formal editorial review accorded ofﬁ  cial Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland publications. The views stated 
herein are those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Working papers are now available electronically through the Cleveland Fed’s site on the World Wide Web: 
www.clevelandfed.org/research.Working Paper 07-14 October 2007
Money and Capital
by S. Borağan Aruoba, Christopher J. Waller, and Randall Wright
We revisit classic questions concerning the effects of money on investment in 
a new framework: a two-sector model where some trade occurs in centralized 
and some in decentralized markets, as in recent monetary theory, but extended 
to include capital. This allows us to incorporate novel elements from the micro-
foundations literature on trading with frictions, including stochastic exchange 
opportunities, alternative pricing mechanisms, etc. We calibrate models with 
bargaining and with price taking in the decentralized market. With bargaining, 
inﬂ  ation has little impact on investment, but a sizable impact on welfare: going 
from 10% inﬂ  ation to the Friedman rule e.g. barely affects capital, but is worth 
3% of consumption. With price taking, this policy increases capital between 3% 
and 5%, and is worth 1.5% of consumption across steady states or 1% with tran-
sition. Fiscal distortions are also big. So is the impact of holdup problems from 
bargaining, even if the decentralized market accounts for only 5% of output. 
Many of these numbers are quite different from previous studies. Our two-sector 
speciﬁ  cation is a key to the results.
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This paper studies the eﬀects of monetary policy on capital formation in the long run. By
this we do not mean that we focus only on steady states, since dynamic transitions are
central in the analysis, but that we focus on fully-anticipated inﬂation and abstract from
signal-extraction problems, nominal rigidities, and other complications that we think are
more likely to more important only in the shorter run. This long-run relation between
money and capital is one of the classic issues in macroeconomics, going back at least to
Tobin (1965) and Sidrauski (1967a,1967b), continuing through Stockman (1981), Cooley
and Hansen (1989,1991), Gomme (1993), Ireland (1994) and many others. All of these
papers adopt a reduced-form approach, in the sense that they put real balances directly into
the utility function, or impose cash-in-advance constraints, e.g., in an attempt to implicitly
capture the role of money in the exchange process, but in other respects use more or less
frictionless models.
While this has some advantages, an alternative approach has developed over the years
that attempts to be relatively explicit about the frictions that make a medium of exchange
essential in the ﬁrst place, and in this eﬀort, the papers have introduced a variety of new
elements into monetary economics, including detailed descriptions of specialization and infor-
mation, bilateral matching and trading, alternative pricing mechanisms such as bargaining,
explicit multi-sector models, and so on. See e.g. Kiyotaki and Wright (1989,1993), Aiyagari
and Wallace (1991), Shi (1995), Trejos and Wright (1995), Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace
(2001), and some other work that we discuss in more detail below. Our goal is to revisit the
relation between money and capital through the lens of this literature on the microfounda-
tions of trading with frictions, to see if the above-mentioned elements matter for the issue,
they way they have been shown to matter for some other issues.1
1See Lagos and Wright (2005), Molico (2006), Craig and Rocheteau (2006), Aruoba, Rocheteau and
Waller (2007), and Ennis (2007) for recent examples where incorportaing frictions like search, bargaining, or
priviate information makes a diﬀerence not only theoretically but also quantitatively for issues in monetary
economics.
2Our starting point is the two-sector framework developed in Lagos and Wright (2005),
where some economic activity takes place in centralized markets and some takes place in
decentralized markets. This is useful because, in addition to potentially providing a role for
media of exchange, decentralized markets allow us to introduce ingredients like stochastic
exchange opportunities and pricing mechanisms such as bargaining, while centralized markets
allow us to incorporate capital exactly as in standard growth theory. This contrasts sharply
with earlier attempts to study money and capital in models with frictions, including Shi
(1999), Shi and Wang (2006), and Menner (2006), who build on Shi (1997), and Molico and
Zhang (2005), who build on Molico (2006). Whilet h a ti sc e r t a i n l ya d m i r a b l ew o r k ,t h o s e
models have only decentralized markets. We ﬁnd it much easier to connect with mainstream
macro, and to incorporate other potentially relevant ingredients like ﬁscal policy, in addition
to capital, when there is also some centralized trade.2
It is, however, not trivial to put capital into the Lagos-Wright model, in the sense that
when one does so in an obvious way one is lead to undesirable implications: the version
in Aruoba and Wright (2003) e.g. displays a strong dichotomy, which means that one can
solve independently for allocations in the centralized and decentralized markets. Among
the undesirable implications, in that model, monetary policy has no impact on investment,
employment or consumption in the centralized market; indeed, based on these results, one
might say that money and growth theory have not been integrated at all (Howitt 2003;
Waller 2003). The model here does not dichotomize, in general, because of explicit feedback
across sectors. In our baseline model, this is because capital used in decentralized market
2Reducing the gap between models of decentralized trade and mainstream macro has been a challenge
for a while. As Azariadis (1993) put it, “Capturing the transactions motive for holding money balances in
a compact and logically appealing manner has turned out to be an enormously complicated task. Logically
coherent models such as those proposed by Diamond (1982) and Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) tend to be
so removed from neoclassical growth theory as to seriously hinder the job of integrating rigorous monetary
theory with the rest of macroeconomics.” As Kiyotaki and Moore (2001) put it, “The matching models are
without doubt ingenious and beautiful. But it is quite hard to integrate them with the rest of macroeconomic
theory — not least because they jettison the basic tool of our trade, competitive markets.” For us, combining
centralized and decentralized markets is not just a device to reduce complexity, as it was in Lagos and Wright
(2005), but a way to bring back some competitive markets and make models with trading frictions closer to
standard macro and growth theory.
3production is itself produced in the centralized market. This allows potentially rich feedback
from money to investment and other centralized market variables, and the issues then become
quantitative. So we calibrate the model to study numerically the eﬀects of monetary and
ﬁscal policy on capital formation, welfare, and other variables.
A ﬁnding that is perhaps surprising — or, at least, that is not seen in previous analyses
— is that the results depend critically on what one assumes about price formation in the
decentralized sector. If we assume generalized Nash bargaining between buyers and sellers
in this sector, inﬂation has almost no impact on capital formation, due to a double holdup
problem aﬀecting both investment and money demand. Intuitively, if sellers have too little
bargaining power their return in this market is to small to matter for aggregate investment;
and if they have too much bargaining power the size of the sector (or, the value of money)
becomes too small to matter for any aggregate variable. In fact our numerical results indicate
that for any bargaining power the impact of inﬂation on investment is quite small. However,
inﬂation can still have a sizable impact on welfare, because it reduces decentralized market
consumption, which is already low due to the holdup problems. To put a number on it,
going from 10% inﬂation to the Friedman rule and making up any revenue loss by lump sum
taxation is worth about 3% of total consumption.
If we switch to a pricing mechanism that avoids the holdup problems, which in our case
could be either price taking or price posting, we ﬁnd something completely diﬀerent. Now
going from 10% inﬂation to the Friedman rule can increase the long-run capital stock between
3% and 5%. This is a lot, and shows the relation between money and capital hinges critically
on how the terms of trade are determined in decentralized trade. Inﬂation is also costly in
terms of welfare in this version of the model, although not as much, and for diﬀerent reasons:
in addition to reducing investment by a lot, compared to the bargaining version, inﬂation
also reduces decentralized market consumption by a lot, but this is less painful, since for
any given inﬂation rate consumption is not so low without holdup problems. The relevant
welfare number is now around 1.5% of total consumption across steady states, and around
41% when we take into account the transition because of course agents have to work and save
to accumulate the additional capital (transitions are not important with bargaining because
the capital stock does not change much).
Some of these results are quite diﬀerent from previous ﬁndings.3 We also ﬁnd sizable
eﬀects from ﬁscal policy, and on balance, if we have to make up revenue with distortionary
instead of lump sum taxes, reducing inﬂation may or may not be a good idea, depending
on details. Thus, given existing tax rates, the Friedman rule is not necessarily the best
policy, even though it would be optimal without distortionary ﬁscal policy. We also show
the holdup problems in the demand for money and capital can be quantitatively important,
even though we only have bargaining in the decentralized market and we ﬁnd this accounts for
only around 5% of aggregate output. These results are reasonably robust to several variations
on the speciﬁcation. For example, they do not depend much on the length of a period — a
year, a month or whatever — mainly because we allow stochastic trading opportunities. This
means that velocity in our model is not constrained by period length, as in typical cash-
in-advance models: when we reduce period length, the probability of needing the money in
the decentralized market can fall, and so velocity need not go up. Hence, unlike a typical
cash-in-advance model, our results are robust at least on this dimension.
Our overall conclusion is that bringing in elements from modern monetary economics
can make a diﬀerence, not only in theory, but for policy-relevant quantitative issues. The
two-sector structure in particular is key. Intuitively, inﬂa t i o ni sat a xo nc a s h - i n t e n s i v e
3Cooley and Hansen (1989,1991) ﬁnd much smaller eﬀects on capital and welfare in cash-in-advance
models — e.g. steady state welfare numbers substantially below 1%. Gomme (1993) gets even smaller eﬀects
in his endogenous growth version. Ireland (1994) gets welfare numbers around 0.67% (although he ﬁnds
reverse causation from growth to the monetary system can be substantial). Lucas (2000) has no capital, or
even a model, but using the approach in Bailey (1956) he gets welfare numbers below 1%;e a r l i e re ﬀorts at
this approach by Lucas (1981) and Fischer (1981) e.g. get 0.3% to 0.45%. Imorhoroglu and Prescott (1991)
also get less than 1%.Af e wp a p e r sﬁnd somewhat larger eﬀects, such as Dotsey and King (1996), in part
because even though inﬂation does not aﬀect total capital very much it aﬀects the amount of resources used
in intermediation (see also Freeman and Kydland 2000 or Aiyagari, Braun and Eckstein 1998); we abstract
from these endogenous intermediation eﬀects here. In a search model, Molico and Zhang (2005) actually get
steady state capital and welfare to increase with inﬂation over the range we consider, due to distributional
eﬀects like those in Molico (2006), while the other search models in fn.1 ﬁnd a big cost of inﬂation, sometimes
4% or more, but those models have no capital.
5consumption goods, and if these goods are produced in a sector that uses capital produced
elsewhere in the economy, then monetary policy can have important eﬀects on the entire
economy even if the cash-intensive sector is small. For this to work, it is important not
only to have both “cash goods” and “credit goods” but for these goods to be produced in
diﬀerent sectors where capital plays diﬀerent roles — which occurs here because capital is an
input in the decentralized market and an input plus an output in the centralized market.4
Given this, we actually do not want in this paper to make too much of “microfounded versus
reduced-form” monetary economics; for the questions at hand, the interesting aspects are
the impact of stochastic trading opportunities, bargaining, and the two-sector structure, not
methodological issues per se.
Related to that point, we do not try to provide a detailed analysis of why claims to capital
(or other inside money) might not displace outside money as medium of exchange. We do
oﬀer a story to this eﬀe c tt h a to n em a yﬁnd useful, the way many people seem to ﬁnd e.g.
Lucas’ (1980) story of the “worker-shopper pair” useful for cash-in-advance models. But the
“worker-shopper” parable actually rationalizes only the use of some medium of exchange,
not whether it should be inside or outside money. So we endeavor to go a little further,
appealing to long-standing ideas about portability and recognizability as a way to motivate
why currency may have a role when capital is a factor. But to be clear, this is not intended
to be our main contribution. While it might be nice to have a compelling and quantitatively
relevant explanation for the coexistence of money and higher-return assets, independent of
that, it seems worth asking how elements from the literature on trading with frictions aﬀect
answers to important questions.5
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model. In
4For comparison, we also consider some alternative scenarios, where e.g. new capital is produced and
traded in the decentralized market sector, as in Shi (1999). Our basic message is fairly robust, as long as
there are multiple sectors and there is feedback via capital across sectors.
5In some other search models, money and capital can both play a role, but only if they have the same
rate of return in equilibrium (e.g. Lagos and Rocheteau 2006; Geromichalos, Licari, and Suarez-Lledo 2007).
There is also a literature using overlapping generations models of money to study capital and growth (e.g.
Schreft and Smith 1997,1988), but the empahsis is very diﬀerent.
6Section 3 we discuss calibration. In Section 4 we present quantitative results. In Section 5
we conclude. The Appendix contains details of the analysis and alternative speciﬁcations.
2T h e B a s i c M o d e l
2.1 General Assumptions
A [0,1] continuum of agents live forever in discrete time. In order to integrate elements of
both mainstream macro and search theory, we adopt the sectoral structure in Lagos and
W r i g h t( 2 0 0 5 ) ,h e r e a f t e rL W ,w h e r ee a c hp e r i o dt h ea g e n t se n g a g ei nt w ot y p e so fe c o n o m i c
activity. Some of this activity takes place in a frictionless centralized market, referred to
as the CM, and some takes place in a decentralized market, referred to as the DM, with
two main frictions: a double coincidence problem and anonymity. These frictions combine to
make some medium of exchange essential in the DM. As this is not the place to go into all of
the details, for formal discussions of essentiality and the role of anonymity we refer readers
to Kocherlakota (1998), Wallace (2001), and Aliprantis, Camera and Puzzelo (2007).6
Given a medium of exchange is essential, one issue in monetary theory is to determine
endogenously which objects serve this function (Kiyotaki and Wright 1989). In order to
focus on other questions, however, other papers avoid this by assuming there is a unique
storable asset that qualiﬁes for the role. Since we obviously cannot assume a unique storable
asset in a paper called “Money and Capital” we need to say a few words about the issue.
A sw es a i d ,w h a tw eh a v et oo ﬀer is a story along the lines of the “worker-shopper” story
in Lucas’ (1980), extended slightly based on ideas about the origins of monetary exchange
going back at least to Menger (1892) involving portability and recognizability. First, in terms
of portability, we assume that in the DM agents have their capital physically ﬁx e di np l a c e
6Lest there is confusion, note that Aliprantis et al. (2006) construct an environment with both CM
and DM meetings where money is not essential. But this environment diﬀers from LW in an important
way having to do with their aggregate production function, which allows a single individual to shut down
the economy by withdrawing his labor services, and hence allows the use of trigger strategies. This cannot
happen in LW, so the result says nothing about essentiality in LW. In any case, the point is moot: Aliprantis
et al. (2007) show money is essential, even with their production function, in a variant of the environment
where some meetings are centralized only in the sense that there are enough agents for the law of large
numbers, not in the sense that everyone is in the same place at the same time.
7at production sites. Thus, when you want to buy something from someone, you must visit
his location, and since you cannot bring your capital it cannot be used in payment. Since
cash is portable, it can. This appeal to spatial separation is very much in the spirit of the
“worker-shopper” idea. But one really ought to go beyond this, and ask why claims to capital
(or perhaps other claims) cannot overcome such spatial separation.
Although this is a tough question, to which we do not have a deﬁnitive answer, one
approach is to invoke recognizability. A blunt version of this is to assume agents in the
DM can costlessly counterfeit claims, other than currency, perhaps because the monetary
authority has a monopoly on the technology for producing hard-to-counterfeit notes. Given
this, a DM seller would never accept a claim to capital from an anonymous buyer, any more
than a personal IOU, and money may be needed as medium of exchange even if capital
is a storable factor of production. As an aside, later we suggest that the money need not
necessarily be in your pocket, and can for instance be in your bank, if it also has access to the
technology for producing hard-to-counterfeit objects. As long as banks must hold reserves
—i . e .a sl o n ga sc u r r e n c yi sh e l db ysomeone — the theory of inﬂation as a tax on currency
or currency-backed objects should apply, as long as capital-backed assets do not drive these
objects out, as can be the case when recognizability is an issue.7
While more work needs to be done on the coexistence of money and other assets, in
general, we now continue with the task of this paper: analyzing capital-theoretic issues in
models incorporating elements from the literature on trading with frictions. As in the neo-
classical growth model, in the CM there is a general good that can be used for consumption
or investment, produced using labor H and capital K hired by ﬁrms in competitive markets.
Proﬁt maximization implies r = FK(K,H) and w = FH(K,H),w h e r eF is the technology,
r the rental rate, and w the real wage; constant returns implies equilibrium proﬁts are 0.I n
7Monetary economics following the approach discussed in Wallace (1996,2001) e.g. involves describing
as part of the model a physical environment where money has an interesting role — i.e. it helps overcome
certain frictions — and this artiﬁcial economy should be internally consistent if not literally realistic. We think
recognizability is an interesting friction, and plausibly a realistic one, that should be considered seriously
when it comes to understanding the role of money and other assets, but pursuing this rigorously is not the
subject of this paper. See Lester, Postlewaite and Wright (2006) for a stab in that direction.
8the DM these ﬁrms do not operate, but an agent’s own eﬀort e and capital k can be used
with technology f(e,k) to produce a diﬀerent good. Notice k appears as an input the DM,
even if it cannot be used as a means of payment, because when you go to a seller’s location
he has access to his capital even if you do not. This is important, because the fact that
capital produced in the CM is productive in the DM is what breaks the above-mentioned
dichotomy and allows money to have interesting eﬀects on the CM.
We generate our double-coincidence problem as follows. With probability σ an agent in
the DM discovers he is a buyer, which means he wants to consume but cannot produce, in
w h i c hc a s eh ev i s i t st h el o c a t i o no fs o m e o n ec h o s e nr a n d o m l yf r o mt h es e to fa g e n t st h a tc a n
produce. With probability σ a na g e n ti saseller, which means he can produce but does not
want to consume, in which case he waits at his location for someone to visit him. And with
probability 1 − 2σ he is a nontrader, in which case we can either interpret him as neither
producing nor consuming, or as producing for his own consumption (it does not matter for
anything we do). In most contexts this taste and technology shock speciﬁcation would be
equivalent to a bilateral matching speciﬁcation, where there is a probability σ of wanting to
consume something produced by a random partner. We use taste and technology shocks,
instead of matching, because we think it ﬁts well with assumptions about spatial separation
with buyers visiting sellers’ locations, but not too much really hinges on this.
Instantaneous utility for everyone in the CM is U(x)−Ah,w h e r ex is consumption and h
labor hours. Linearity in h reduces the complexity of the model (see Chiu and Molico 2007
for what happens without this assumption in a related model). Alternatively, Rocheteau
et al. (2006) show how to get exactly the same results with general utility by assuming
indivisible labor and lotteries, à la Rogerson (1988). In the DM, with probability σ you
are a consumer and have utility u(q), and with probability σ you are a producer and have
disutility − (e),w h e r eq is consumption and e labor eﬀort. If we solve q = f(e,k) for
e = ξ(q,k),t h e nc(q,k) ≡  [ξ(q,k)] is the utility cost of producing q,g i v e nk.8 Since it is
8In Appendix B.1 we show cq > 0, ck < 0, cqq > 0,a n dckk > 0, under the usual monotonicity and
convexity assumptions on f and  ,a n dcqk < 0 if fkfee <f efek, which holds under the additional assumption
9hard to disentangle technology and preferences at this level, we normalize  (e)=e,w h i c hi s
basically choosing units for eﬀort, and is of little consequence here since we do not regard
e as observable. Otherwise preferences have the usual properties. Agents discount between
the CM and DM at rate β but not between the DM and CM.
Government sets the money supply so that M+1 =( 1+τ)M,w h e r e+1 denotes next
period. We use τ as our monetary policy instrument, but as long as the Fisher equation
holds, which is reasonable for long-run analysis, it is equivalent to target the inﬂation rate or
the nominal interest rate.9 Government also consumes G, levies a lump-sum tax T,al a b o r
income tax th,ac a p i t a li n c o m et a xtk,a n das a l e st a xtx in the CM. We omit sales tax in
the DM to streamline the presentation, and because it matters little for quantitative results.
Letting δ be the depreciation rate of capital, which is tax deductible, and p the CM price
level, the usual government budget constraint is
G = T + thwH +( r − δ)tkK + txX + τM/p.
If W(m,k) and V (m,k) are the value functions in the CM and DM, then the DM problem
for the representative agent is
W(m,k)= m a x
x,h,m+1,k+1
{U(x) − Ah + βV+1(m+1,k +1)} (1)

















that k is a normal input.
9The Fisher equation can be interpreted as a no-arbitrage condition if we use standard methods to price
nominal claims between one CM and the next CM. If one goes that route, one has to assume these claims
cannot be used as a means of payment in the DM; this is the same as worrying about claims to capital in the
DM, and again recognizability can be brought to bear. Alternatively, even if no such claims exist, the Fisher
equation can be interpreted merely as a piece of notation deﬁning in terms of the inﬂation and real interest
rate a variable i that we call the nominal rate. We often use i in the discussion, but nothing hinges on this;
one can recast all the theory and quantitative work in terms of inﬂation or money growth if one prefers.






A[1 + (r − δ)(1− tk)]
w(1 − th)
; (4)
and second, since (m,k) does not appear in (2), for any distribution of (m,k) across agents
entering the CM the distribution of (m+1,k +1) is degenerate.10
Moving to the DM, we have
V (m,k)=σV
b(m,k)+σV
s(m,k)+( 1− 2σ)W(m,k), (5)
where the values to being a buyer and a seller are
V
b(m,k)=u(qb)+W (m − db,k) (6)
V
s(m,k)=−c(qs,k)+W (m + ds,k), (7)
with qb and db (qs and ds) denoting goods and money exchanged when buying (selling).


































































10This is the simpliﬁcation that comes from quasi-linear utility (or, alternatively, indivisible labor). Note
that it does not mean two people with very diﬀerent (m,k) will look identical after one period — for interiority
and hence for the result to go through, (m,k) cannot be too disperse, but if agents start with similar (m,k)
then they stay similar. Also, we are simply assuming the concavity of V and interiority here; one can adapt
the discussion in LW to guarantee this is valid, but we do not bother, since we check it directly in the
quantitative analysis.
11Once we specify how q and d are determined, in equilibrium, we can substitute for their
derivatives in (9) and (10). But ﬁrst, as a benchmark, consider the planner’s problem without
anonymity, so that money is not essential:
J(K)= m a x
q,X,H,K+1
{U(X) − AH + σ[u(q) − c(q,K)] + βJ+1(K+1)} (11)
s.t. X = F(K,H)+( 1− δ)K − K+1 − G
Eliminating X, and again assuming interiority, we have the FOC
q : u
0(q)=cq(q,K)






T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o nJ0(K)=U0(X)[FK(K,H)+1− δ] − σck(q,K) implies
U
0(X)=βU
0(X+1)[FK(K+1,H +1)+1− δ] − σβck(q+1,K +1). (13)
From the ﬁrst condition in (12), q = q∗(K) where q∗(K) solves u0(q)=cq(q,K).T h e n
the paths for (K+1,H,X) satisfy the Euler equation (13), the second FOC in (12), and the
constraint in (11). This characterizes the ﬁrst best.11
Note the presence of the term −βσck(q+1,K +1) > 0 in (13), which reﬂects the fact that
investment aﬀects DM as well as CM productivity because K is used in both sectors. If K
did not appear in c(q) the system would dichotomize: we could ﬁrst set q = q∗,w h e r eq∗
solves u0(q)=c0(q), and then solve the other conditions independently for (K+1,H,X).T h e
fact that K is used in the DM and produced in the CM breaks this dichotomy: in general
11To be precise, assume the environment is stationary. Then the methods in Stokey and Lucas (1989) tell
us the solution is fully characterized by the FOC and envelope condition, or, equivalently, we can replace
the FOC for K+1 and envelope condition by the Euler equation and standard transversality condition. This
same comment applies when we deﬁne equilibrium, but we will not dwell on it, below. Also, one can use
standard methods to check when there is a unique steady state and the planner’s solution converges to it
under the typical kind of assumptions, since once we substitute q = q∗(K), except for notation, this is a
standard optimal growth problem. Things are more complicated for equilibria because we allow for ﬁscal,
monetary, and bargaining distortions. In Appendix B.4 we show analytically that for the price-taking version
there exists a unique steady state for the functional forms we use in the calibration; in the bargaining version
we rely on numerical results.
12one must solve simultaneously for the paths for all the variables (q,K+1,H,X).N o t e a l s o
that, although here we assume it is the same K used in both sectors, Appendix A.1 presents
a version with two distinct capital goods. Also, Appendix A.2 presents a version where K
is used only in the CM but produced traded in the DM (which is reminiscent of Stockman
1981). As discussed in Section 4.3, these variations do not aﬀect the main results too much,
since in each case there is feedback across sectors via the capital stock.
2.2 Bargaining
Suppose now that each agent with a desire to consume in the DM visits one who can pro-
duce. As suggested above, when physical capital is immobile, claims other than cash are
counterfeitable, and buyers are anonymous, trade requires money. If the buyer’s and seller’s
states are (mb,k b) and (ms,k s), we assume for now that the terms of trade (q,d) solve the
generalized Nash problem, with bargaining power for the buyer given by θ,a n dt h r e a tp o i n t s
given by continuation values. Since the buyer’s payoﬀ from trade is u(q)+W(mb − d,kb)
and his threat point is W(mb,k b), (3) implies his surplus is u(q)−Ad/pw(1 − th). Similarly,












s.t. d ≤ mb.
As in LW, one can show that in any equilibrium d = mb, and this implies q ≤ q∗(ks)
where q∗(ks) is the solution to u0(q)=cq(q,ks). Inserting d = mb and taking the FOC with












Writing q = q(mb,k s),w h e r eq(·) is given by solving (14) for q as a function of (mb,k s),
we can now compute the relevant derivatives in (9) and (10) as ∂d/∂mb =1 , ∂q/∂mb =
13A/pw(1 − th)gq > 0 and ∂q/∂ks = −gk/gq > 0,w h e r e
gq =
u0cq[θu0 +( 1− θ)cq]+θ(1 − θ)(u − c)[(u0cqq − cqu00)
[θu0 +( 1− θ)cq]2 > 0
gk =
θu0ck [θu0 +( 1− θ)cq]+θ(1 − θ)(u − c)u0cqk
[θu0 +( 1− θ)cq]
2 < 0.









A + A(r − δ)(1− tk)
w(1 − th)
− σγ(q,K), (17)
where it is understood that q = q(M,K),a n d




ck(q,K)gq(q,K) − cq (q,K)gk(q,K)
gq(q,K)
< 0. (18)
Substituting (16) and (17), as well as prices p = AM/w(1 − th)g(q,K), r = FK(K,H),a n d














0(X+1){1+[ FK(K+1,H +1) − δ](1− tk)} (20)
−σβ(1 + tx)γ(q+1,K +1).






X + G = F(K,H)+( 1− δ)K − K+1. (22)
An equilibrium with bargaining is deﬁned as (positive, bounded) paths for (q,K+1,H,X)
satisfying (19)-(22), given policy and the initial condition K0. A monetary equilibrium
satisﬁes q>0 at every date. A nonmonetary equilibrium satisﬁes q =0at all dates, while
(K+1,H,X) solves (20)-(22) with γ =0 , which is exactly the equilibrium for a standard
nonmonetary model with these preferences (e.g. Hansen 1985). Although we are interested
in dynamics, as a reference point, when M+1 =( 1+τ)M for ﬁxed τ we can deﬁne a steady
14state as a constant solution (q,K,H,X) to (19)-(22). In steady state inﬂation is τ and the
nominal interest rate is given by the Fisher equation i =( 1+ρ)(1+τ)−1,w h e r eρ =1 /β−1











If capital is not used in the DM, then c(q,K)=c(q) and γ(q,K)=0 . This version
dichotomizes, and since M appears in (19) but not (20)-(22), monetary policy aﬀects q
but not (K+1,H,X). Equilibrium does not dichotomize when K enters c(q,K);a si nt h e
planner’s problem, this implies we cannot solve independently for q and the CM variables.
Notice however that θ =1implies γ(q,K)=0even if K enters c(q,K).I nt h i sc a s e ,( 2 0 ) -
(22) can be solved for (K+1,H,X),t h e n( 1 9 )d e t e r m i n e sq.S oi fθ =1money still does not
inﬂuence CM variables, even though anything that aﬀects the CM (e.g. taxes) inﬂuences
q. Intuitively, when θ =1sellers do not get any of the surplus from DM trade, and so
investment decisions are based solely on returns to K that accrue in the CM. This is an
extreme version of a holdup problem in the demand for capital. More generally, for any
θ>0, sellers do not get the full return on their capital from DM trade, and hence compared
to the eﬃcient outcome they underinvest.
This capital holdup problem is not present in standard models, and constitutes a dis-
tortion over and above the ineﬃciencies that arise from th,t k,t x > 0,f r o mi>0,a n df r o m
the holdup problem in money demand emphasized in Lagos and Wright (2005).12 If we run
the Friedman Rule by setting i =0and levy only lump-sum taxes, we are left with the two
holdup problems. In many models all such problems can be resolved simultaneously if one
simply sets the bargaining power parameter θ correctly (Hosios 1990). In the present model
12Generally, capital holdup problems have been perhaps neglected in macro, although as Caballero and
Hamour (1998) say: “From a macroeconomic perspective, the prevalence of unprotected speciﬁcr e n t sm a k e s
it a potentially central factor in determining the functioning of the aggregate economy.” Caballero (1999)
further says “the quintessential problem of investment is that is almost always sunk .. opening a vulnerable
ﬂank,” and the problem is more serious “when the exposed ﬂanks are largely controlled by economic agents
with the will and freedom to behave opportunistically.” This is exactly what happens here.
15this is impossible: θ =1resolves the problem in the demand for money, but this is the worst
case for investment; and θ =0resolves the problem in the demand for capital, but this is the
worst case for money. Under bargaining there is no θ that can eliminate the double holdup
problem, and as we shall see, this has implications for both the empirical performance of
bargaining models and their policy implications.
2.3 Price Taking
While our two holdup problems cannot simultaneously be solved by bargaining, other so-
lution concepts work better. It is by now well known that competitive search equilibrium
with price posting resolves, multiple holdup problems, as does competitive equilibrium with
Walrasian price taking — aat least in our model, if not in all models.13 Since it is easier to
present, relative to posting, we present price taking in the DM. One can interpret this as
a monetary version of the labor-market model in Lucas and Prescott (1974), where large
numbers of buyers visit ‘islands’ with large numbers of sellers, and on each ‘island’ prices
are taken as given. This ﬁts well with our assumptions about locations and taste-technology
shocks. Thus, to pursue the analogy with maro-labor, the diﬀerence between our price-taking
and bargaining models is essentially that the former assumes buyers and sellers meet in large
groups, as in Lucas and Prescott (1974), while the latter assumes they meet bilaterally, as
in Mortensen and Pissarides (1994).
With price taking, the DM value function has the same form as (5), but now
V
s(m,k)=m a x
q {−c(q,k)+W (m +˜ pq,k)} (25)
V
b(m,k)=m a x
q {u(q)+W(m − ˜ pq,k)} s.t. ˜ pq ≤ m (26)
where ˜ p is the DM price level (which generally diﬀers from the CM price level p). Market
clearing implies buyers and sellers choose the same q. As with bargaining, buyers spend all
13Shimer (1995), Moen (1997) and Acemoglu and Shimer (1999) discuss competitive search equilibrium
in the context of labor markets; Rocheteau and Wright (2005) extend this to monetary economies, and also
show that competitive equilibrium works well without search externalities but not as well as competitive
search equilibrium with search externalities.
16their money, so q = M/˜ p.T h eF O Cf r o m( 2 5 )i scq(q,k)=˜ pWm =˜ pA/pw(1 − th).I n s e r t i n g















A + A(r − δ)(1− tk)
w(1 − th)
− σck(q,k).














0(X+1){1+[ FK(K+1,H +1) − δ](1− tk)} (29)
−σβ(1 + tx)ck(q+1,K +1).
The other equilibrium conditions (21)-(22) are the same as in the previous model. An equi-
librium with price taking is given by (positive, bounded) paths for (q,K+1,H,X) satisfying
these conditions, given policy and K0.T h ed i ﬀerence between bargaining and price taking
is the diﬀerence between (19)-(20) and (28)-(29). Notice the equilibrium condition for q in
this model looks like the one from the bargaining model when θ =1 , and the equilibrium
condition for K looks like the one from the bargaining model when θ =0 , suggesting that
price taking avoids both holdup problems.
We now verify this. First set tk = th = tx =0 . Then under price taking the equilibrium
conditions for (K+1,H,X) are the same as those for the planner problem in Section 2.1.








Using (27) this reduces to 1/pw = β/p+1w+1.S i n c e w = A/U0(X), it further reduces
to p/p+1 = U0(x)/βU0(X+1). Since in any equilibrium the slope of the indiﬀerence curve
17U0(x)/βU0(X+1) equals the slope of the budget line 1+ρ,w i t hρ equal to the real interest
rate, the relation in question ﬁnally reduces to p+1/p =1 /(1 + ρ). Using the Fisher equation,
this holds and hence q = q∗(K) solves (28) iﬀ we set the nominal rate to i =0 . We therefore
conclude that when i =0and we use only lump-sum taxes, under price taking, we get the
ﬁr s tb e s ta l l o c a t i o n .
2.4 A Short Digression on Banking
At ﬁrst blush it might seem the relevant notion of money in the model should be coins and
currency,o rM0. This is one interpretation, but we want to suggest that it is not the only
possible one. Without going into too much detail, we mention that one can introduce banks
into the framework following e.g. the approach in Berentsen, Camera and Waller (2006) or
the approach in He, Huang and Wright (2005,2006). Berentsen et al. assume that after
trading stops in the CM, so that agents have decided on their ˆ m, it is revealed which ones
will want to consume and which ones will be able to produce while banks are still open but
before agents go to the DM.14 As the sellers have no use for money, they deposit it into the
banks, who then lend it to buyers. One can imagine them lending out the same physical
currency, or as keeping it in the vault and issuing bank-backed securities that can be used
in payments, at least as long as these securities are also not easily counterfeitable. This
changes some details, and it may be worth studying the diﬀerences quantitatively in future
work, but basically that model with explicit banks is not so diﬀerent qualitatively from what
we have here.
He et al. study a similar environment, but also assume that cash can be stolen while
bank-backed securities cannot (think of traveler’s checks or debit cards protected by a PIN;
theft and counterfeiting are obviously related issues). Assuming fractional reserves, one can
derive the money multiplier, albeit in a simpliﬁed version of that model, with M1 determined
endogenously as a function of M0 and the legal reserve ratio. If the resource cost of banking
goes to zero, in that model, cash may actually stop circulating, to be replaced in all DM
14Chiu and Meh (2007) do something similar.
18transactions by bank-backed securities. Otherwise, that model is also fairly close to what
we have here. Now, we would certainly agree that more work needs to be done to seriously
address many interesting issues related to ﬁnancial intermediation in these kinds of models,
and we are there yet; we digress on the topic here only because we do not necessarily want
to take M literally as coins and currency in the following exercises. That is, we want to use
M1 for some of the quantitative work, mainly to facilitate comparison with previous studies,
although we will also present results for other measures including M0.15
3 Quantitative Analysis
3.1 Preliminaries
We ﬁrst need to do some accounting. The price levels in the CM and DM are p and ˜ p = M/q,





in the bargaining version of the model by (14), and
p =
AM
(1 − th)qcq (q,K)FH(K,H)
(31)
in the price-taking version by (27). Nominal output is pF (K,H) in the CM, and σM in
the DM (since each of the σ buyers spends M dollars). Using p as the deﬂator, real output
in the CM is YC = F (K,H) a n di nt h eD Mi sYD = σM/p. Hence total real output is
Y = YC + YD.
Deﬁne the share of output in the DM, sD = YD/Y, which we do not calibrate, but
compute indirectly from other variables. To see how this works, note that velocity is v =
pY/M = σY/YD,s i n c eYD = σM/p. Hence, if we know σ and v we know sD = σ/v.T h e
maximum σ can be is 1/2,a n dg i v e nM1 velocity is around 5,e . g . ,sD is bounded above
15As Lucas (2000) discusses, there is often a disconnect between monetary theory, where it looks like
M0 is the relevant variable, and quantitative work, where people use M1. The papers mentioned in this
digression are in part motivated as a way to address this issue.
19by 10%. With our calibrated value of σ, sD is actually closer to 5%.T h e r ea r et w op o i n t s
we want to emphasize. First, to discuss the relative size of the two sectors, one does not
have to take a stand on which goods and services are traded in the DM and CM (although
this certainly might be an interesting avenue for future work). Second, the results presented
below cannot be said to depend on having an unreasonably large amount of decentralized
trade — around 95% of economic activity here looks just like what ones see in standard
frictionless models.
We will also discuss the markup μ,d e ﬁned by equating 1+μ to the ratio of price to
marginal cost. The markup in the CM market is 0, since it is competitive. The markup in
t h eD Mu n d e rp r i c et a k i n gi sa l s o0. With bargaining, however, the markup in the DM is
derived as follows. Marginal cost in terms of utility is cq (q,K). With our utility function,
a dollar is worth A/p(1 − th)w utils, so marginal cost in dollars is cq (q,K)p(1 − th)w/A.
Since the DM price is ˜ p = M/q,t h eD Mm a r k u pμD is given by
1+μD =
M/q





after eliminating M using (30). The aggregate markup is then μ = sDμD.





M/p. As mentioned above, we could do everything in terms of the elasticity
with respect to the inﬂation rate, and the results will be the same to the extent that the
Fisher equation holds in the data. Indeed, we do use the inﬂation rate when we discuss the
elasticity of investment, but for money demand we use the interest rate mainly because this
is what most others do. In any event, consider ξ under bargaining (price taking is similar).
























It is now a matter of substituting ∂q/∂i, ∂K/∂i and ∂H/∂i (see Appendix B.2) to yield ξ
as a function of the allocation and parameters.
203.2 Calibration













The cost function c(·) comes from  (e)=e and q = eχk1−χ,w i t hψ =1 /χ;i fψ = χ =1then
k does not appear in c(·) and the model dichotomizes. The parameter b is introduced so
that u(0) = 0, which is helpful for technical reasons (it keeps the threat point in bargaining
well deﬁned for all η). This means relative risk aversion is not constant, but if b ≈ 0 then
relative risk aversion is approximately constant at ηq/(q + b) ≈ η. We set b =0 .0001 and
ε = η =1as a benchmark to facilitate comparison with the literature, but we show that the
results are fairly robust to these choices in Section 4.3. We normalize C =1with no loss in
generality.16
To describe our calibration strategy for the remaining parameters, we start with a heuris-
tic description, then provide details. The ﬁrst point we want to establish is that our approach
is a natural extension of standard methods. To pick one typical application, Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992) e.g. study a one-sector growth model parameterized by
U =l o g ( x)+A(1 − h) and Y = K
αh
1−α
(for their indivisible-labor version; for the divisible-labor version replace 1 − h by it’s log-
arithm). We call this the standard model. There are four parameters that they calibrate,
one at a time, as follows. First, set the discount factor β =1 /(1 + ρ) where ρ is some
16We are not over-normalizing here. Consider the following argument for the case of b =0(i.e. for
log utility). Before normalizing, the utility function is U = B log(x) − Ah + C log(q) − De.W r i t e t h e
DM production function as q = Zeχk1−χ. Then making a change of variable ˜ q = qD/Z1/χ we have U =
B log(x) − Ah + C log(˜ qZ1/χ/D) − ˜ qk(χ−1)/χ which is basically what we use. Obviously we can normalize
C =1 . With log utility, the choice of constants Z and D has no eﬀect on individual decisions (it aﬀects only
the units of DM output, but this will be neutralized by the relative price), so we can normalize these how we
wish. Now this argument is literally true only for log utility, and we have b small but positive. However, for
the values of b we used, in practice, we varied D from 1 to 100 for example without aﬀecting the numerical
results very much at all.
21observed average interest rate. Then set the depreciation rate δ = I/K to match the ob-
served investment-capital ratio. Then set α to match either labor’s share of income LS or
the capital-output ratio K/Y , since these yield the same result, given there are no distorting
taxes in the model (see below). Finally, set A to match observed average hours worked h.
This standard method can be adapted to many scenarios. For example, Greenwood et
al. (1995) calibrate a two-sector model with home production as follows. Consider









where x =[ Dxε
m +( 1− D)xε
n]
1/ε,a n dxm, hm and km are consumption, hours and capital
in the market while xn, hn and kn are consumption, hours and capital in the nonmarket
(home) sector. After setting β =1 /(1+ρ), as above, the two-sector version of the standard
method is this: set δm and δn to match Im/Km and In/Kn; set αm and αn to match Km/Ym
and Kn/Ym; and set A and D to match hm and hn.W ea r el e f tw i t hε, which is hard to pin
down based on steady state observations, and is therefore typically set based on estimates
of relevant elasticities.
Since we also have a two-sector model, we use a variant of the home-production calibration
method, although it diﬀe r ss l i g h t l yb e c a u s ew ed on o tw a n tt o( w ed on o th a v et o )t a k ea
s t a n do nw h a tt h eC Ma n dD Mc o r r e s p o n dt oi nt h ed a t a . T h u s ,ﬁrst set β, δ and A as
above. Then set α and ψ to match both K/Y and LS. As we said, in the standard one-
sector model, without taxes, it does not matter if one calibrates α to LS or K/Y , but with
proportional taxes on capital income, calibrating α to LS yields a value for K/Y that is
too low (Greenwood et al. 1995; Gomme and Rupert 2005). The idea here is to set α to
match LS, then try to use ψ to match K/Y , since DM production provides an extra kick
to the return on K. Given this, we set the utility parameter B and probability σ to match
some money demand observations discussed below, which is the analog of picking ε in home
production framework, and must be done in any calibrated monetary model.
This completes the heuristic description. We now go into detail. Our benchmark model
is annual, to facilitate comparison with the literature, but we also discuss quarterly and
22monthly results below. Then we pin down β =1 /(1 + ρ) by ρ =0 .025, which is the annual,
after-tax, real interest rate in the 1951-2004 U.S. data, based on an average pre-tax nominal
rate on Aaa-rated corporate bonds of 7.2%,a ni n ﬂation rate from the GDP deﬂator of 3.6%,
a n dat a xo nb o n dr e t u r n so f30% from the NBER TAXSIM model.17 We more or less directly
observe other taxes as well; we use th =0 .242 and tk =0 .548,t h ea v e r a g ee ﬀective marginal
rates in McGrattan et al. (1997); Gomme, Ravikumar and Rupert (2005) and Gomme and
Rupert (2005) have similar numbers. We compute tx =0 .069 directly as the average of
excise plus sales tax revenue divided by consumption. We also observe G/Y =0 .25.W es e t
δ = I/K =0 .070, using residential and nonresidential structures plus producer equipment
and software for K.W es e tα =0 .288 to get LS =0 .712, which we get using the method in
Prescott (1986).
This pins down all but ﬁve parameters, A and B from preferences, the cost parameter
ψ, the probability σ, and in the bargaining model θ; see Table 1 (all tables are at the end of
the paper). These parameters are determined simultaneously to match the following targets.
First, hours worked as a fraction of discretionary time, H =1 /3 (Juster and Staﬀord 1991).
Second, average velocity, v =5 .29 which we measure directly using M1.T h i r d ,K/Y =2 .32
when we measure K as deﬁned above. Fourth, a money demand elasticity of ξ = −0.226,
estimated as discussed in Appendix B.3. Fifth, in the bargaining model, the markup μ =0 .10
(Basu and Fernald 1997). We choose the parameters simultaneously to minimize the distance
between the targets in the data and model. Since we can have more targets than parameters
when we minimize deviations, sometimes we add the long-run elasticity of investment with
respect to inﬂation as a target, which we estimate as ζ = −0.023 (on quarterly data) using
same method used for money demand.18
17At the risk of being redundant, given what was said above about the Fisher equation, we mention the
following. Although we did not explicitly incorporate them in the discussion of equilibrium, obviously we can
price bonds that trade between meetings of the CM in the standard way, and use observations on interest
rates to pin down β. But, as suggested above regarding assets other than money, in general, we assume
these bonds do not circulate in the DM. Again, one could guarantee this with the right assumptions about
counterfeiting and recognizability.
18Adding ζ as a target is something like adding the empirical labor supply elasticity in calibrating a
standard business cycle model, which one may or may not like; in any case we report results with and
233.3 Decision Rules
We ﬁrst scale all nominal variables by M,s ot h a tˆ m = m/M, ˆ p = p/M etc. Then the
individual state becomes (ˆ m,k,K), where in equilibrium ˆ m =1and k = K.A l t h o u g hp a r t s
of the above presentation were more general, we are now interested in recursive equilibrium,
given by time-invariant decision rules and value functions [q(K),K +1 (K),H(K),X(K)]
and [W(K),V (K)] solving the relevant equations — e.g. (19)-(22), (1) and (8) in the bargain-
ing model. We solve these equations numerically using a nonlinear global approximation,
which is important for accurate welfare computations if we move far from steady state.19 Fig-
ure 1 plots the decision rules and value function for two preferred parameterizations (Models
3 and 5 as described in the next section) for four scenarios: the planner’s problem; monetary
equilibrium at the Friedman rule; monetary equilibrium at 10% inﬂation; and nonmonetary
equilibrium. We discuss the economic content of these pictures below.
4R e s u l t s
4.1 Model ‘Fit’
The basic calibration results are in Table 2. One column lists the relevant moments in the
data, while the others list the moments from ﬁve speciﬁcations of the model. Model 1 uses
bargaining in the DM with bargaining power θ =1 , giving up on the markup μ as a target;
it is presented mainly as a benchmark since we already proved that θ =1implies money
cannot aﬀect the CM variables at all. Models 2 and 3 use bargaining with θ calibrated along
with the other parameters; the diﬀerence between Models 2 and 3 is that the latter adds
the investment elasticity ζ as a target while the former does not. Models 4 and 5 use price
taking in the DM, so there is no θ, calibrating the rest of parameters to match the targets
other than the markup; the diﬀerence between Models 4 and 5 is again that the latter adds
without targeting ζ. Although the estimated value of −0.023 may appear small, it is statistically signiﬁcant
and economically relevant: raising inﬂation from our benchmark value to 7% e.g. is predicted based on the
regression to reduce investment by around 2.3%, which is nothing to scoﬀ at.
19Speciﬁcally, we use the Weighted Residual Method with Chebyshev Polynomials and Orthogonal Col-
location. See Judd (1992) for details, and Aruoba et al. (2006) for a recent comparison of solution methods.
24ζ as a target while the former does not.
We do well matching the targets with two exceptions. First, we match the markup μ
only if we assume bargaining and calibrate θ, rather than ﬁxing it at 1 or assuming price
taking, for obvious reasons. Second, we do a good job matching K/Y and ζ only in the
price-taking model, for reasons that we now explain. Intuitively, our calibration sets the CM
technology parameter α to match LS and then tries to hit K/Y using the DM technology
parameter ψ (although we think this way of looking at things is instructive, it is meant only
to be suggestive, since in fact we pick all of the parameters simultaneously). When ψ =1 ,
K is not used in the DM, and K/Y is too low, as in the standard model once taxes on
capital income are introduced. As we increase ψ above 1 the return on K from its use in the
DM increases and hence so does K/Y . But, in practice, with bargaining, this eﬀect is tiny
because the holdup problem eats up most of the DM return on K.
Of course, the size of this eﬀect depends on bargaining power, but even if we pick θ to
maximize K/Y we cannot get it big enough. This is due to the double holdup problem: if
θ is big then buyers have all the bargaining power, which makes q big, other things being
equal, but gives little return from DM trade to sellers; and if θ is small then sellers have
all the bargaining power, which gives them a big share of the return, but only on a very
small q. There is no way around it with bargaining. With price taking, however, the holdup
problems vanish, and we can pick ψ to match K/Y exactly. The same intuition about how
holdup problems aﬀect the level of K/Y also explains how they aﬀect the elasticity ζ:w i t h
bargaining, any extra return on K from DM production will not increase aggregate K much,
since the DM return is a small fraction of the overall return to investment. Again, this is
not a problem with price taking, and we can hit ζ perfectly.
Earlier we alluded to the fact that the DM share sD is around 5%,a ss h o w ni nT a b l e
2. We think this is reasonable, in the sense that we would be uncomfortable if sD were too
big, since then we would be very far from the standard growth model. Because sD is small,
however, we need a markup in the DM of around 200% to match the economy-wide μ.T h i s
25may seem high, but there several points to be made. First, although 10% is a reasonable
aggregate target, actual markups vary a lot in micro data.20 Second, if we relax our extreme
assumption of a perfectly competitive CM we could get away with a much smaller DM
markup. Third, it turns out that we can actually recalibrate μD to 1.0, 0.4 or even 0.1
rather than 2.0, and the key results will not change very much — which may be surprising,
but it will be explained in Section 4.3. Given this, we keep the aggregate target of μ =0 .1,
with an implied μD of around 2.0, in the baseline model.
Finally, one might ask how we match the empirical money demand curve, which is often
taken to be a measure of ‘ﬁt’ in monetary calibration exercises (see e.g. Lucas 2000, Lagos
and Wright 2005, or Craig and Rocheteau 2006). Comparing plots of i versus M/pY from
the data and from our model, we see something similar to what sees with other models
in the literature. In particular, as with other approaches, it is not easy to match both
the observations with very low i and high M/pY from the ﬁr s td e c a d ea n dt h o s ew i t hl o w
M/pY from the last decade in the sample — which is no surprise given changes over time in
transactions technologies. Although the ‘ﬁt’ is about as good on this dimention as in other
models, we actually do not put much weight on looking at plots of i versus M/pY,s i n c et h i s
speciﬁcation for money demand assumes a unit income elasticity which is rejected by the
data in the regression results reported in Appendix B.3.
4.2 Experiments
Here we consider experiments where, starting in a steady state, we make a once-and-for-all
change in the growth rate of money τ, and track the economy over time. Since inﬂation in
steady state equals τ, we abuse language slightly and describe our experiments as a change
in inﬂation, but note that inﬂation actually does not jump to the new steady state level in
the short run (i.e. it may not equal τ during the transition). Table 3 contains results for
20As Faig and Jerez (2005) report, data at http://www.census.gov/svsd/www/artstbl.html indicate the
following: at the low end, warehouse clubs, superstores, car dealers and gas stations have μ between 17%
and 20%; and at the high end, specialty food, clothing, footwear and furniture stores are over 40%.N o n eo f
these are as high as 200%, although the sample does not include convience stores, magazine stands, and so
on, where markups may be considerably higher.
26each of the ﬁve models when we perform a common experiment and change τ1 =0 .1 to the
Friedman rule, which is τ2 = −0.0239 in the baseline calibration. For now, we make up any
change in government revenue with the lump-sum tax T, and consider other ﬁscal options
below. Table 3 presents ratios of equilibrium values of several variables at the two inﬂation
rates.21
The ﬁrst thing to note is that q1/q2 is considerably less than 1,v a r y i n gb e t w e e n0.67 and
0.87, depending on the model. Again, the idea is that inﬂation is a tax on DM activity, and
these results show that this tax is quantitatively very important. In Model 1 this is the only
eﬀect, since θ =1implies monetary policy has no impact on the CM. In Models 2 and 3,
in theory monetary policy does aﬀect the CM, but the impact is tiny as one should expect
from the discussion in Section 4.1. Based on this, Models 1-3 all predict that going to the
Friedman rule increases aggregate output Y by 2%, almost all due to the change in q.I n
Models 4 and 5 the eﬀects are diﬀerent. First, q actually changes by more; and second, now
K changes, and by quite a lot — either 3% or 5%, according to Model 4 or 5. This makes
CM consumption X change by about 1%, and the net impact on Y is now 3%.
Before discussing the intuition for these results, consider welfare. As is standard, we solve
for ∆ such that agents are indiﬀerent between reducing τ and increasing total consumption
(X and q)b yaf a c t o r∆. We report the answer comparing across steady states — jumping
instantly from τ1 and K1 to τ2 and K2 —a sw e l la st h ec o s to ft h et r a n s i t i o nf r o mK1 to K2
and the net gain to changing τ starting at K1. This net gain is the true beneﬁt of the policy
change, although the steady state comparison is still interesting, as it tells us how much an
agent facing τ1 and K1 would pay to trade places with someone facing τ2 and K2.I nM o d e l
1 there is no transition since τ does not aﬀect K, and in Models 2 and 3 we expect it to
be unimportant, since τ does not aﬀect K very much, but in Models 4 and 5 the transition
could be signiﬁcant. We also report the net gain to reducing τ to 0, instead of all the way
to Friedman rule, to check how much of the gain comes from eliminating inﬂation and how
21When a 1 appears in italics, the true number is not exactly unity but shows up this way due to rounding,
to distinguish eﬀects that are theoretically 0 from those that not exactly 0 but numerically very small.
27much comes from deﬂation (most comes from the former).
In Model 1, with θ =1 , going from 10% inﬂation to the Friedman rule is worth around
3/4 of 1% of consumption, commensurate with many previous ﬁndings (recall fn.3). In
Models 2 and 3, with θ ≈ 3/4,t h i sp o l i c yi sw o r t ho v e r3% of consumption. Intuitively,
at θ ≈ 3/4 the money holdup problem makes q very low, and so any additional reduction
is very costly. In Models 4 and 5 the steady state gain is about half that in Models 2 and
3, since the economy is closer to the ﬁrst best with price taking than it is with bargaining.
In Models 4 and 5 inﬂation has a sizable impact on K and X, but since much of the gain
accrues only in the long run and agents must work more and/or consume less during the
transition, the net gain is closer to 1%. Figure 2 shows the transitions for Models 3 and 5. In
Model 5, e.g., in the short run H increases by around 1% and X falls slightly before settling
down to their new steady state levels, q jumps on impact by around 50% and quickly settles
at the new steady state.
Table 4 compares the Friedman rule and ﬁrst best allocations. The diﬀerences are big,
mainly due to taxation (McGrattan et al. 1997 ﬁnd similar results in standard nonmonetary
models with taxes). We also report the gain to moving from the Friedman rule to the ﬁrst
best after setting th = tk = tx =0and recalibrating other parameters. In Models 4 and 5, the
gain in this case is 0 because as we showed the Friedman rule implements the ﬁrst best. In
Model 1, with a capital holdup but no money holdup problem, the steady state gain is around
4%, although much is lost in transition. In Models 2 and 3, with both holdup problems, it is
around 5% and 15%. These calculations provide measures of the impact of holdup problems:
based on the steady state comparisons, e.g., one could say 4% of consumption is the cost of
capital holdup and an additional 1% − 11% is the cost of money holdup. Although there
is no single ‘correct’ way to decompose these eﬀects, this suggests holdup problems may be
quantitatively important, even though we have bargaining only in the DM and sD is only
around 5%.22
22The calibrated parameters diﬀer across the columns in Table 4. Suppose we instead ﬁx the parameters
as in Model 3, and consider three cases: (i) θ =1 ; (ii) θ calibrated; and (iii) price taking. With taxes, going
28Table 5 reports the actual allocations, not just the ratios of the allocations, at diﬀerent
τ, to facilitate comparisons across models. Notice e.g. that q is considerably lower in Models
2 and 3 than in other models, showing the impact of the money holdup problem. Also,
comparing Models 4 and 5, notice how the latter has a considerably bigger K/Y ratio for
moderate inﬂation rates, although K/Y is basically the same at the ﬁrst best; in other words,
K is much more sensitive to inﬂation in Model 5. The table also reports the allocation in
the nonmonetary equilibrium, which can be considered the limit as inﬂation goes to ∞.
Although we can of course compute the cost of very high inﬂation — e.g., going from 100%
inﬂation to the Friedman rule is worth around 14% in Model 3 and 8% i nM o d e l5—o n e
should take these calculations cautiously, since agents may well devise other ways to trade
i nt h eD Ma tv e r yh i g hi n ﬂation (like using foreign currency) and since our numerical results
are sensitive to parameter choices at very high inﬂation.
At the risk of redundancy, we also discuss results using the decision rules. In Figure 1,
for Model 5 we see that as we lower τ the decision rule for K+1 shifts up, and steady state K
increases, although it is still far from the ﬁrst best even at the Friedman rule (the symbols
on each curve show the location of the steady state, but the ﬁrst best steady state K =2 .23
is oﬀ the chart in this case). Also, the decision rule for q shifts up, increasing q in the short
run and more in the longer run as we move along the decision rule for q with the growth in
K.T h el a t t e re ﬀect is important here, since K g r o w sal o t .I nM o d e l3t h ed e c i s i o nr u l ef o r
K+1 and hence steady state K change little. The decision rule for q shifts, giving a short-run
eﬀect, but there is little additional long-run eﬀect. Still, inﬂa t i o ni sv e r yc o s t l yi nM o d e l3
because the decision rule for q at the Friedman rule is quite far from the decision rule at the
ﬁrst best, so any change in q matters a lot, while in Model 5 the decision rules for q at the
from the FR to FB in these three scenarios is worth, in terms of steady state (net) comparisons: (i) 28.56
(15.85); (ii) 39.89 (26.12); and (iii) 10.30 (5.47). With taxes set to 0 we get: (i) 5.55 (1.42); (ii) 15.29 (10.81);
and (iii) 0 (0). Looking at the results without taxes, one could say the cost of capital holdup in terms of
steady state is 5.55, or 1.42 with transition, and the cost of money holdup is 9.74, or 9.39 with transition.
With taxes the cost of capital and money holdup including transitions are almost identical, 10.38 and 10.27.
Again, there is no single ‘correct’ way to measure these eﬀects, but all of this indicates that holdup problems
can be important.
29Friedman rule and ﬁrst best are virtually coincident.
One can also consider lowering τ and making up the revenue shortfall with proportional
rather than lump sum taxes. Cooley and Hansen (1991) e.g. ﬁnd that if proportional taxes
must be used then eliminating inﬂation is not beneﬁcial. Table 6 reports our results for the
case where we make up the revenue with lump-sum taxes, reproducing Table 3, and with
labor or consumption taxes.23 Going to the Friedman rule and making up revenue with labor
taxes requires raising th from 25% to around 30%. This reduces Y around 3% in Models
1-3, 2% in Model 4 and 1% in Model 5. The net welfare gain is positive with bargaining and
θ calibrated, but negative with price-taking. A similar discussion applies to tx. In general,
these results are quite sensitive, but we think it is interesting that when existing tax rates
are given, going to the Friedman rule may not be the best policy. More work needs to be
done on this issue, as we discuss further in the Conclusion.
4.3 Robustness
We redid all the calculations for many alternative speciﬁcations, but in the interest of space,
in Table 7 we report the results in terms of one statistic: the net welfare gain of going
from 10% inﬂation to the Friedman rule. The ﬁr s tr o wi st h eb e n c h m a r km o d e l .T h eﬁrst
robustness check involves shutting down the distorting taxes, both for the case where other
parameters are kept at benchmark values, and when they are recalibrated. Most of the results
are similar to the benchmark calibration, except for Model 5 and, to a lesser extent, Model
4, where the cost of inﬂation is somewhat lower without distorting taxes. This is because
the Friedman rule achieves the ﬁrst best in price-taking models without distortionary taxes,
and hence the cost of moderate inﬂa t i o ni sl o wb yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e m .W ed on o tt h i n k
this is a problem: it is no surprise that the results can depend on what one assumes about
taxation, and since taxes are a fact of life, we trust the benchmark calibration.
23We could not solve the case where we try to make up the shortfall with capital taxation, since increasing
tk lowered K by so much that suﬃcient revenue was not forthcoming (as in Cooley and Hansen 1991). Also,
for these experiments, we allow the government to issue a bond paying interest equal to the discount rate so
that we do not have to adjust taxes each period during the transition.
30We report the eﬀects of varying utility parameters b, ε and η. One can look at the
numbers for oneself, but we conclude the results are not overly sensitive. One can also vary
β, δ etc. over reasonable ranges without aﬀecting things too much (not reported). We also
show that changing our target for the markup does not matter much: e.g. lowering μD to
40%, which makes the aggregate μ closer to 2% instead of 10%, only reduces the welfare
cost from 3.08% to 2.77% in Model 2 and from 3.43% to 2.96% in Model 3. This may be
surprising, but it can be understood as follows. First, note that when θ =1the markup
is actually negative in Table 2, because take-it-or-leave-it oﬀers by buyers means p = AC
and AC < MC. Thus, just to get μ>0 we need θ signiﬁcantly below 1:e . g .μD =0 .01
requires θ ≈ 0.927, which implies the money holdup problem is already important enough
to generate a sizable welfare cost of around 2.76%. Since it is not so clear exactly what the
right target for the markup should be, or what is the best way to get this out of a model, it
is good that the results do hinge on μD.
The table also shows that the results are not too sensitive to using diﬀe r e n tt i m ep e r i o d s
for the calibration, although more work could be done to investigate this in more detail. What
is clear is that the results are not at all sensitive to assuming a diﬀerent length for a period —
a quarterly or monthly instead of an annual model delivers very similar predictions. This is
easy to understand: to go from an annual to a quarterly or monthly model, we simply adjust
inﬂation, velocity, interest rates, K/Y and I/K by the relevant factor. The calibrated σ
declines, because a shorter period reduces the probability of consuming in any given DM, but
the welfare conclusions do not change. We ﬁnd this important because changing frequency
typically does change the results, including welfare implications, in many models, including
the typical cash-in-advance model where agents generally spend all their money every period.
This is not the case when σ ∈ (0,1), which means that agents in the DM do not all spend
all their money.24
24One might say that this model has a ‘precautionary demand’ for money. We do not contend that one
couldn’t somehow introduce randomness and a ‘precautionary demand’ into cash-in-advance models; we are
rather suggesting that one should.
31What does matter is the empirical measure of money, M0, M1, M2 or M3.O n er e a s o n
is these alternative measures imply diﬀerent values for average velocity, and given our cal-
ibration method, this changes the size of the DM and thus the cost of inﬂation (although
this is not the whole story, since the diﬀerent measures also lead to diﬀerent estimates of
the elasticity ξ, which explains e.g. how M3 can yield a lower welfare cost than M2). One
intuition comes from the traditional method of computing the cost of inﬂation as the area
under the money demand curve: using a narrower deﬁnition of M shifts the curve down and
reduces the estimated cost. This is not meant as an endorsement of the traditional method,
however, since our diﬀerent models all generate very similar money demand curves, yet im-
ply quite diﬀerent welfare numbers. In any case, while it is perhaps unfortunate that results
depend on the deﬁnition of M, at least we understand why it is so, and it is bound to be
true for any theory of money.
One can go beyond these issues and consider robustness with respect to larger modeling
choices. We mentioned earlier a version of the model with two capital stocks, KC and KD
(see Appendix A.1). Tables 8 and 9 report results for this model with bargaining and with
price taking, called Models 6 and 7. These two-capital analogs of Models 3 and 5 do about
as well as in matching the targets. In Models 6 and 7, q actually increases by more than in
the baseline models when we reduce τ, which tends to make inﬂation more costly. However,
there are also other eﬀects, and hence the net cost of inﬂation is actually lower in Model 7
than 5. These other eﬀects occur because in Model 5, e.g., the same K is used to produce
q, X and K, but in Model 7 q is produced with KD while X and KD are produced with
KC. Despite this detail, the overall picture from a two-capital-stock analysis is similar to
the base case.
Tables 8 and 9 also report results from another extension (see Appendix A.2), where K
is used as an input in the CM only but is produced and traded in the DM, as in Shi (1999),
w h i c hm e a n so n en e e d sc a s ht ob u yn e wc a p i t a l ,a si nS t o c k m a n( 1 9 8 2 ) .T h eb a r g a i n i n ga n d
price-taking versions are called Models 8 and 9. Now inﬂation taxes capital accumulation
32directly, and not only indirectly via q.W ec a ns e et h a tt h i sy i e l d sas i z a b l ee ﬀect of τ on K
under bargaining, as well as under price taking. Overall, the results are not so diﬀerent from
the base case, however, even if the welfare cost estimates are aﬀected somewhat. It may be
worth studying these alternative models in more detail in the future, although to do so one
might want to rethink the strategy for calibration. We presented them here mainly to show
that the basic ideas carry over to alternative formulations, and that many of the numerical
results do not hinge too critically on some of the details.
4.4 Summary of Results
Here is what we think we learn from all of this:
• One can integrate elements of models with explicit trading frictions and standard
growth theory in a way that generates interesting eﬀects of money — i.e., there is no
dichotomy.
• O n ec a nu s et e x t b o o km e t h o d st oc a l i b r a t et h em o d e l ,e v e nt h o u g hi tc o n t a i n ss o m e
novel parameters.
• To do so one does not need to take a stand on which goods are traded in the DM and
CM, even if one wants to estimate the relative size of the two sectors; our numbers
imply the DM accounts for around 5% of total output.
• We do a good job matching most of the targets, although (obviously) with price taking
we cannot match the markup, and (less obviously) with bargaining we cannot match
K/Y ,o rt h ee l a s t i c i t yo fK with respect to i, due to holdup problems.
• Inﬂation is a tax on DM consumption, and the eﬀects are big.
• Qualitatively, given K is useful for producing q,i n ﬂation reduces investment; quanti-
tatively, this eﬀect is tiny under bargaining, and big (3 to 5%) under price taking.
33• Under price taking, reducing inﬂation from 10% to the Friedman rule is worth 1.5%
across steady states, and 1% taking into account the transition; it is worth over 3%
under bargaining.
• With either bargaining or price taking much of the gain is achieved by reducing inﬂation
to 0 rather than going all the way to the Friedman rule.
• The costs of ﬁscal distortions are quite big, and hence it may or may not be desirable to
replace inﬂation with proportional taxes, depending somewhat delicately on parameter
values and other details.
• The welfare cost of holdup problems can be big even if the DM is fairly small.
• Most of these results are fairly robust to modeling choices and parameter values, al-
though the empirical measure of M does make a diﬀerence.
• Many of these results diﬀer from ﬁndings in the literature.
• Key elements in the analysis include: allowing for bargaining instead of (i.e. in addition
to) price taking; having a demand for money based on preference shocks; and using an
explicit two-sector structure.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has developed an explicit multi-sector model with trading frictions in some mar-
kets, as in some recent monetary theory, but extended to include capital, as in the neoclassical
growth model. There is feedback across sectors because capital produced in the centralized
market is used as an input in the decentralized market. This means that monetary policy,
which we model in terms of a choice of the (fully-anticipated) inﬂation rate, and which has
the direct eﬀect of a tax on decentralized market activity, can in principle have interesting
eﬀects on investment and other centralized market variables. We think that these results
constitute some progress on the challenge of integrating of models with trading frictions and
34mainstream macro, that they extend each of those paradigms individually, and that they po-
tentially open up doors to much additional work. The model is not diﬃcult to calibrate, and
we have already summarized the main quantitative ﬁndings. Here we discuss some possible
directions for future research.
It might be interesting to take more seriously the details of commercial or central banking
in this type of model. We do not necessarily expect this to aﬀect the overall message too
much — as long as monetary policy helps determine inﬂation, and inﬂation is a tax on either
currency or currency-backed objects that serve as a medium of exchange, the basic economic
intuition would seem to apply — although this needs to be checked. But the quantitative
results could change once the amount of resourced used in ﬁnancial intermediation becomes
endogenous, as in some of the papers mentioned in footnotes in the Introduction. This may
also help to sort out which measures of money is appropriate, by allowing diﬀerent measures
(M0, M1, etc.) to be determined endogenously in the model. Again, some papers mentioned
a l r e a d ym a k es o m ep r o g r e s so nt h i s ,b u tt h e r ei sm o r et ob ed o n e . M o r eg e n e r a l l y ,s o m e
ﬁnancial institutions develop in part in response to trading frictions like those in the model
— money being only one example — and so this may provide a natural framework to think
about these other institutions.
It may be interesting to consider more general preferences, which allows one to break
the dichotomy even without feedback via capital across sectors. Rochetaeu, Rupert and
Wright (2007) e.g. consider a utility function is still (eﬀectively) quasi-linear but allows non-
separabilities between CM and DM consumption. Thus, anything that aﬀects q, including
money, aﬀects x depending on whether these goods are complements or substitutes. That
model has no capital and has not been quantiﬁed — and in fact it is not straightforward how
one would calibrate it — but in principle in could be done. The approach in this project was to
explore feedback through the technology side, again by having capital produced in one sector
and used in the other, and for this we came up with a simple calibration strategy. But it might
be interesting to build models with feedback across sectors coming from both preferences
35and technology. Also, as suggested earlier, it would surely be interesting to study optimal
policy, to see e.g. what the best monetary policy is when we do not restrict attention to
empirically given proportional tax rates. This is somewhat of an involved exercise, however,
and beyond the scope of the current project; see Aruoba and Chugh (2006).
One could also pursue alternative approaches to picking parameters; here we concentrated
on a simple calibration procedure. We then used the theory to measure the predicted eﬀects
of monetary and ﬁscal policy; one could go beyond this and compare these predictions with
time-series or cross-country data, but again that is beyond the scope of the paper. One
could also add shocks to study the quantitative business-cycle properties of the model and
compare those with the data; here we focused only on the long-run implications for money
and capital. Finally, a big outstanding issue not only for this type of model, but for all of
monetary economics, is to delve deeper into the coexistence of money and other assets. We
discussed some ideas in this regard, but a rigorous analysis of that diﬃc u l tt o p i cw a sn o tt h e
object of the exercise. We hope people agree that it is worth exploring issues like the eﬀect of
money on capital in models that include ingredients from theoretical monetary economics,
even if one does not have a deﬁnitive formal explanation for coexistence. We believe the
approach in this paper can provide interesting quantitative insights, while formal monetary
theorists continue to pursue the quest for deeper and better theories.
36A Appendix: Alternative Speciﬁcations
We sketch two alternative models mentioned in the text. First, suppose there are two distinct
capital goods: kC is used in the CM, and kD in the DM. Both are produced in the CM, and
neither can be used for payment in the DM. They depreciate at rates δC and δD.F o r
simplicity, there is no tax on kD, and we present only the bargaining version (price taking
and the planner’s problem are similar). The CM problem is
W(m,kC,k D)= m a x
x,h,m+1,kC+1,kD+1
{U(x) − Ah + βV(m+1,k C+1,k D+1)}
s.t. (1 + tx)x = w(1 − th)h +[ 1+( r − δC)(1− tk)]kC − kC+1 − T +
m − m+1
p
+(1− δD)kD − kD+1.
















= βVz(m+1,k C+1,k D+1).
T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sf o rWm, Wk and Wz are derived in the obvious way. The usual logic
implies the distribution of (m,kC,k D) is degenerate for agents leaving the CM.
The DM is as before, except we replace k with kD. The value function and envelope
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X + G = F(KC,H)+( 1− δC)KC − KC+1 +( 1− δD)KD − KD+1. (37)
An equilibrium is now given by paths for (q,KC+1,K D+1,H,X) satisfying (33)-(37). This
model does not dichotomize, in general, since KD is used in the DM and produced in the
CM.
37For the next alternative model, we revert to one capital good, but suppose new k is
acquired in the DM. As in Shi (1999), agents do not consume DM output q, but use it
as an intermediate input that is transformed one-for-one into k, which is an input to CM
production. Each period a fraction σ of agents in the DM can produce the intermediate input,
and a fraction σ can transform it into capital. Although agents cannot acquire new capital
in the CM, they are allowed to trade used capital. We again present only the bargaining
version.
Let k b et h ea m o u n to fc a p i t a lh e l db ya na g e n te n t e r i n gt h eC Ma n dk0
+1 t h ea m o u n to f
capital taken out, and hence into the next DM. We show how to construct equilibrium where
the distribution of (m,k0) coming out of the CM is degenerate, even though the distribution
going in is not. To begin, the CM problem is
W(m,k)= m a x
x,h,m+1,k0
+1
U(x) − Ah + βV+1(m+1,k
0
+1)
s.t. (1 + tx)x = w(1 − th)h +[ r − (r − δ)tk]k +( 1− δ)φk − φk
0
+1 − T +
m − m+1
p



















T h ee n v e l o p ec o n d i t i o n sa r eo b t a i n e di nt h eo b v i o u sw a y .
Buyers in the DM spends all their money, and bring k = k0+q to the CM. The bargaining
solution now implies that q solves mb/p = g(q,r,w,φ) where
g(q,r,w,φ) ≡
(1 − th)w[θc(q)+( 1− θ)c0 (q)q][r − (r − δ)tk +( 1− δ)φ]














pw(1−th) − c[q(˜ m)]
o
,
where the expectation is with respect to the money holdings ˜ m of agents and we assume











A[r − (r − δ)tk +( 1− δ)φ]
(1 − th)w
.
Since Vm is independent of k0,t h eF O Cf o rm+1 in (38) implies m+1 is independent of k0
+1
and hence degenerate.














ˆ g(q,K,H,φ) ≡ g[q,FK(K,H),F H(K,H),φ]
Ξ(q,K,H,φ) ≡
FK (K,H)(1− tk)+δtk +( 1− δ)φ
ˆ g(q,K,H,φ)
.











w h i c hi sa na r b i t r a g ec o n d i t i o nt h a ti m p l i e st h ed e m a n df o rk0
+1 is indeterminate. Hence we
can set k0
+1 =( 1− δ)K for all agents, so (m+1,k 0
+1) is degenerate. The other conditions are




(1 − th)FK (K,H)
(42)
X + G = F(K,H) (43)
An equilibrium is now given by paths for (q,φ,K+1,H,X) satisfying (39)-(43). Again, it
obviously does not dichotomize, in general.
B Appendix: Details
B.1 The Cost Function
Here we verify the properties of the DM cost function c(q,k), derived from a production
function q = f(k,e) that is strictly increasing and concave, and a disutility of eﬀort  (e) that
39is strictly increasing and convex. By deﬁnition, saying k is a normal input means that, in
the problem min{we+ rk} s.t. f(k,e) ≥ q, the solution satisﬁes ∂k/∂q = fefek −fkfee > 0.
To proceed, rewrite q = f(k,e) as e = ξ(q,k) Then ∂e/∂q = ξq =1 /fe > 0 and ∂e/∂k =
ξk = −fk/fe < 0.A l s o ξqq = −fee/f3
e > 0, ξkk = −(f2
efkk − 2fefkfke + f2
kfee)/f3
e >
0,a n dξkq = −(fekfe − feefk)/f3
e. Hence, cq =  0/fe > 0, ck = − 0fk/fe < 0, cqq =
[ 00 02fe −  0fee]/f3
e > 0, ckk = −[ 0 (fefkk − 2fefkfke + f2
kfee) − fef2
k 00]/f3
e > 0 and cqk =
−[ 00fefk −  0 (fkfee − fefek)]/f3
e. These results establish that c is increasing and convex in
q and decreasing and convex in k,a n dt h a tcqk < 0 if k i san o r m a li n p u t ,a sc l a i m e d .
B.2 Money Demand Elasticity




M/P. To compute this in the bargaining
model (price taking is similar) we need to determine ∂q/∂i, ∂K/∂iand ∂H/∂i and substitute








ρ =[ FK(K,H) − δ](1− tk) −
σ(1 + tx)γ(q,K)
U0 [F(K,H) − δK − G]
U
0 [F(K,H) − δK − G]FH(K,H)=
A(1 + tx)
(1 − th)





































and Θ =( 1− tk)FKK −
σ(1+tx)


















ij refers to the (i,j) element of B−1.
40B.3 Money Demand Estimation
Here we clarify how we get our empirical elasticity of money demand with respect to the
nominal rate, ξ. Following a common speciﬁcation in the literature (e.g. Goldfeld and Sichel
1990), we write the log of real money (˜ mt) as a linear function of log nominal interest (˜ ıt)a n d
log real output (˜ yt), allowing for ﬁrst-order autocorrelation in the residuals. We estimated
this using levels and ﬁrst diﬀerences, but since the relevant results are statistically identical
we report only the latter:
∆˜ mt = βy∆˜ yt + βi∆˜ ıt − ρβy∆˜ yt−1 − ρβi∆˜ ıt−1 + ρ∆˜ mt−1 + νt
βy =0 .369 (0.124),β i = −0.226 (0.045), ρ =0 .347 (0.131), R
2 =0 .423
Here ρ is the AR(1) coeﬃcient for the residuals in the original equation in levels and the
numbers in parentheses are standard errors. The long-run interest elasticity is ξ = −0.226,
with a relatively small standard error of 0.05.
B.4 Existence and Uniqueness
Here we show that for the functional forms we use in the calibrated model, under pricing
taking, a steady state exists and under certain conditions is unique. With the functional

















































1−α +( 1− δ)K − K+1 − G (47)
























1 − (δ + G
K)k1−α . (48)











































Notice (51) is one equation in k. The RHS approaches ∞ as k → 0 and approaches a value
less than 1 as k → (δ + G/K)1/(α−1). Hence it has a solution. The solution is unique if we
assume α(ψ + η − 1) < (1 − α)ψη, since then the RHS is strictly decreasing. Given k,( 4 8 )
yields K,( 4 9 )y i e l d sq, (50) yields X,a n dH = k/K. So we have existence, and uniqueness
under a simple restriction.
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48Table 1 - Benchmark Calibration
(a) ‘Simple’ Parameters
Parameters b ε = η β th tk tx G/Y δ α
Targets 0.0001 1 0.976 0.242 0.548 0.069 0.25 0.070 0.288
(b) Remaining Parameters
Parameters A B ψ σ θ
Targets H v K/Y −ξ μ
Target Values 0.33 5.29 2.32 0.23 0.10
Table 2 - Calibration Results
Data Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5







σ 0.21 0.22 0.24 0.22 0.22
B 1.47 0.69 1.09 2.40 2.38
ψ 1.65 3.51 2.08 1.15 1.30
A 3.90 1.83 2.89 6.45 6.46
θ − 0.72 0.75 − −
Calibration Targets
μ 10.00 -1.56 (*) 10.00 9.78 0.00 (*) 0.00 (*)
K/Y 2.32 2.23 2.23 2.22 2.32 2.39
H 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
v 5.29 5.30 5.30 4.92 5.29 5.28
ξ −0.23 -0.23 -0.23 -0.22 -0.23 -0.23
ζ −0.023 0.000 (*) -0.001(*) -0.001 -0.013 (*) -0.023
Miscellaneous
sD 3.96 4.10 4.76 4.06 4.12
μD -39.3 244.2 205.3 0.00 0.00
Sq. Error 0.0016 0.0015 0.9210 0.0000 0.0010
Note: The calibration targets marked with (*) are not targeted in the corresponding
model and is not included in the computation of the squared error.
49Table 3 - τ =0 .1 vs. Friedman rule
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Allocation
q1/q2 0.75 0.87 0.81 0.67 0.69
K1/K2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95
H1/H2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
X1/X2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
Y 1
C/Y 2
C 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.98
Y 1/Y 2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
Welfare
ss gain 0.73 3.09 3.46 1.30 1.69
transition 0.00 −0.02 −0.02 −0.28 −0.50
net gain 0.73 3.08 3.43 1.02 1.19
net gain to 0 0.69 2.35 2.64 0.88 0.99
Table 4 - Friedman rule vs. ﬁrst best
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Allocation
q1/q2 0.72 0.20 0.25 0.92 0.87
K1/K2 0.43 0.28 0.37 0.53 0.55
H1/H2 0.74 0.68 0.72 0.75 0.75
X1/X2 0.61 0.55 0.59 0.64 0.65
Y 1
C/Y 2
C 0.63 0.53 0.59 0.68 0.69
Y 1/Y 2 0.61 0.48 0.56 0.68 0.69
Welfare
ss gain 22.35 60.33 39.84 15.70 15.22
transition −10.07 −21.18 −13.77 −7.22 −6.95
net gain 12.28 39.15 26.07 8.48 8.26
Welfare with no Taxes
ss gain 4.23 5.12 16.10 0.00 0.00
transition −3.36 0.00 −4.59 0.00 0.00
net gain 0.87 5.12 11.51 0.00 0.00
50Table 5 - Allocations
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
First Best
q 1.06 1.83 1.23 0.98 0.98
YC 0.74 0.88 0.78 0.70 0.70
Y 0.80 1.03 0.88 0.73 0.74
K 2.51 3.83 2.93 2.17 2.23
H 0.45 0.48 0.46 0.44 0.44
X 0.44 0.49 0.46 0.42 0.42
K/Y 3.14 3.72 3.32 2.96 3.02
Equilibrium at Friedman rule
q 0.76 0.36 0.30 0.90 0.86
YC 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48
Y 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.51
K 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.16 1.23
H 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
X 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
K/Y 2.20 2.20 2.19 2.32 2.41
Equilibrium at τ =0
q 0.71 0.35 0.29 0.82 0.79
YC 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.47 0.48
Y 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50 0.50
K 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.15 1.21
H 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
X 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
K/Y 2.21 2.22 2.20 2.32 2.40
Equilibrium at τ =0 .1
q 0.57 0.32 0.24 0.60 0.59
YC 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.47 0.48
Y 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.49
K 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.13 1.17
H 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
X 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27
K/Y 2.24 2.25 2.23 2.32 2.38
Nonmonetary Equilibrium
q 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
YC 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
Y 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46
K 1.08 1.07 1.08 1.07 1.07
H 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
X 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26
K/Y 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32
51Table 6 - τ =0 .1 vs Friedman rule and...
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Making up Revenue by T
q1/q2 0.75 0.87 0.81 0.67 0.69
K1/K2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95
H1/H2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
X1/X2 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
Y 1/Y 2 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97
T1/Y 1 −3.43 −3.37 −3.39 −2.97 −2.63
T2/Y 2 −1.28 −1.22 −1.08 −0.89 −0.58
ss gain 0.73 3.09 3.46 1.30 1.69
transition 0.00 −0.02 −0.3 −0.29 −0.51
net gain 0.73 3.08 3.43 1.02 1.19
Making up Revenue by th
q1/q2 0.77 0.90 0.83 0.67 0.70
K1/K2 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.02 1.00
H1/H2 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.04
X1/X2 1.08 1.08 1.08 1.06 1.05
Y 1/Y 2 1.03 1.03 1.03 1.02 1.01
New th 0.296 0.296 0.301 0.293 0.291
ss gain −2.19 −0.12 0.13 −1.40 −0.93
transition 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.19 −0.02
net gain −1.71 0.39 0.66 −1.20 −0.94
Making up Revenue by tx
q1/q2 0.76 0.90 0.82 0.67 0.70
K1/K2 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.01 0.98
H1/H2 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.04 1.03
X1/X2 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.05 1.04
Y 1/Y 2 1.02 1.02 1.02 1.01 1.00
New tx 0.130 0.130 0.136 0.127 0.126
ss gain −1.45 0.69 0.99 −0.67 −0.20
transition 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.05 −0.19
net gain −1.09 1.07 1.38 −0.63 −0.38
52Table 7 - Robustness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Benchmark 0.73 3.08 3.43 1.02 1.19
Only Lump-sum Tax
Recalibrated 0.82 3.63 3.83 0.89 0.53
Not 0.73 3.06 3.41 0.67 0.60
Utility Parameters ε and η
ε =2 ,η=1 0.75 3.34 3.46 0.92 1.05
ε =5 ,η=1 0.78 3.49 3.60 0.87 0.96
ε =1 ,η=1 /2 0.74 5.45 7.31 1.33 1.25
ε =2 ,η=1 /2 0.54 5.51 7.61 1.15 1.13
ε =5 ,η=1 /2 0.57 5.94 8.38 1.06 1.05
ε =1 ,η=2 0.75 2.33 6.38 0.81 1.06
ε =2 ,η=2 0.75 2.18 6.66 0.77 0.91
ε =5 ,η=2 0.76 2.25 6.99 0.74 0.81
Utility Parameter b
b =0 .00001 0.73 3.26 3.36 1.02 1.19
b =0 .0001 0.73 3.08 3.43 1.02 1.19
b =0 .001 0.73 3.37 3.60 1.02 1.19
b =0 .01 0.73 3.56 4.20 1.02 1.12
b =0 .1 0.74 3.92 3.92 1.07 1.21
Markup Target
μD =1 0 % − 2.48 2.80 − −
μD =4 0 % − 2.77 2.96 − −
μD =1 0 0 % − 2.81 3.16 − −
Measures of Money
M0 0.04 0.37 0.37 0.05 0.05
M1 0.73 3.08 3.43 1.02 1.19
M2 2.06 7.22 9.84 2.67 2.39
M3 1.42 5.92 7.31 1.94 1.62
Frequency
Quarterly 0.73 3.05 3.28 0.95 1.16
Monthly 0.72 3.03 3.23 0.95 1.18
Period
1961-2004 0.64 3.06 2.88 1.22 0.68
1951-1998 0.74 3.45 3.62 0.78 1.21
1986-2004 0.84 2.87 3.14 1.61 0.96
53Table 8 - More Robustness : Calibration Results
Data Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Calibrated Parameters
σ 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.19
B 0.96 2.35 1.01 0.13
ψ 2.41 1.96 3.62 7.70
A 2.55 6.41 2.09 0.28
G 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.15
θ 0.61 − 0.20 −
Calibration Targets
μ 10.00 9.86 0.00 (*) 10.02 0.00 (*)
K/Y 2.32 2.21 2.43 2.38 2.69
G/Y 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
H 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33 0.33
v 5.29 5.08 5.28 5.51 1.53
ξ −0.23 −0.22 −0.23 −0.08 −0.20
ζ −0.023 −0.001 −0.023 −0.025 −0.025
Miscellaneous
sD 4.67 3.98 4.42 12.46
μD 211.36 0.00 226.76 0.00
Sq. Error 0.9456 0.0024 0.4444 0.5516
Note: The calibration targets marked with (*) are not targeted in the corresponding
model and not included in the computation of the squared error.
T a b l e9-M o r eR o b u s t n e s s:τ =0 .1 vs. Friedman rule
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Allocation
q1/q2 0.67 0.62 0.80 0.93
K1/K2 1.00 0.99 0.80 0.93
Z1/Z2 0.68 0.62 − −
φ
1/φ
2 − − 1.10 1.03
H1/H2 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.01
X1/X2 1.00 1.00 0.93 0.98
Y 1
C/Y 2
C 1.00 0.99 0.95 0.99
Y 1/Y 2 0.98 0.97 0.92 0.92
Welfare
ss gain 7.77 1.59 7.61 1.41
transition −0.12 −0.49 −1.17 −0.38
net gain 7.65 1.10 6.44 1.03
net gain to 0 5.82 0.96 4.68 0.83
54Figure 1 - Decision Rules and Value Functions
(a) Model 4
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55Figure 3 -10% to FR: Transitions
(a) Model 4
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